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No one but the late Mr. BINNS' has been able to resist
Chief Justice MARSHALL'S short, pithy demonstration of
the power and duty of courts to disregard statutes when
unconstitutional. "IThe theory of every such government
(one having a written constitution), must be, that an Act
of the Legislature refbgnant to tw Constitution is void." '
The case of by-law and charter in ordinary practice is a
perfect analogy.
This rule, which also applies to State laws repugnant
to State constitutions, was enunciated in Marbury v. Madison, and has always been applied by the courts. But how
slight has been its capacity to restrain our judiciary from
a reckless use of the power thus authoritatively recognized
as existing!
I The author of BINNs' Justice.

tion.-[]ED.].
- op. in Marbury v.

A statement made in conven-

Madison, I Cr. U. S., 177 (1803). See an interesting
discussion on the question to whom the credit is due for first communicating this doctrine, in Carson's Hist. of Sup. Ct., p. 12o.-[ED.].
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A good illustration of the truth of this last assertion
is found, in Pennsylvania. A former chief justice of that
State, Mr. Justice GORDON, held that the legislature could
not interfete with the contracts of grown men by prohibiting th. payment of wages by orders on stores for supplies.'
I The case in which this doctrine was enunciated was that of Godcharles & Co. v. Wigeman, IIq Pa. St., 431 (1886). The case was a suit
Iy a workman in an iron mill for wages. The defendant company by
way of set-off attempted to introduce in ividence payments of wages
made in store orders at the request of the plaintiff. The plaintiff objected
to the evidence, on the ground that payment of wages in anything else
than lawthl money of the United States was illegal tinder the Act ofJune
29, r88x, P. L., 147. The object of this Act was "to secure to operatives.
and laborers engaged in and about coal mines, manufactories of iron and
steel, and all othek manufactories, the payment of their wages-at regular
iixtervala, and in lawful money of the United States."
Sec. 2 of the Act provides thai: "All persons, firms, etc., . . shall
settle with their employees at least once in each mouth and pay them the
auiounts 4ue them for their work 'and services, in lawful money of,the
United States, oi by cash order." The third section made it unlawful
to issue an-order'otlier than a dash order. In view of this Act the objectlon of the plaintiff to the evidence was'sustainedby the trialjudge. The
Supreme Coitrt of the State ordered a new trial, on the ground that the
evidence should have been admitted, the Act being unconstitutional.
fh 'gound was broader than need have been taken. Constitutional or
unconstitutional, the defendants offered to prove that.they had given the
store orders to the plaintiff at his request, and he had received -the benefit
from them. The fact that A benefits by the illegal act of B, which act
he solicits B to perform, can be considered by a jury as a set-off in an
action by A against B. Granted that the Actwas unconstitutional, the jury.
had a right to estimate the amount of the benefit which the plaintiff received from the defendantat the plaintiff's request, even though the act
of'the defendant was illegal The jury, of course, would consider the
actual benefit, and .not -ttface value of the store orders. There was
,probably a payment, if tlie-*oikman wished it to be made in pork rather
than money. It would be almost absurd to say that the legislature meant
to say that an accord and'satisfaction left the debt as before if it happened
to be a debt for wages; the act was aimed at the coftract to accept'
* orders, not at the voluntary acceptance of the goods mentioned in the
order.
The Court, however, chose to grant a new trial on the ground that"
the Act was unconstitutional. But it is not clear, from the reported opinion, whether they considered the Act unconstitutional because it was in
conflict with the Federal Constitution, or with some express prohibition
in the State constitution, or on the ground that a State constitution, by
general grant of legislative power to the State government, will never be
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That men at the time of the adoption of the Federal Constitution believed in the power of State legislatures, unless
restrained by the constitutions they were framing, Federal or
State, to do much mischief, injustice and iniquity, cannot be
disputed. Else why do we find them putting a xiauzzle on
presumed to grant the power to interfere between the contracts of grown
men. The Court in its opinion, through Judge GORDON, says: "The
first, second, third and fourth sections of the Act are utterly unconstitutional and void, inasmuch as by them an attempt has been made by the
legislature to do what, in this country, cannot be done; that is, prevent
persons who are suijuris from making their own contracts. The act is
an infringement alike of the right of the employer and the employee;
more than this, it is an insulting attempt to put the laborer under a legislative tutelage, which is not only degrading to his manhood, but subversive of his rights as a citizen of the United States.
"He may sell his labor for what he thinks best, whether money or
goods, just as his employer may sell his iron or his coal, and any and
every law that proposes to prevent him from so doing is an infringement
of his constitutional privileges, and consequently vicious and void."
The Act could be argued to be in contravention of the Constitution
of the United States only on the theory that the Fourteenth Amendment
in protecting the rights of "citizens of the United States" from violation
by a State, reads into the Constitution as prohibitions on the States, the
prohibitions on the United States Government respecting the liberty
of individuals. These prohibitions, according to this view, are either
written, as in the case bf the first eight amendments to the Constitution,
or implied, as was contended by the late Mr. Justice BRADLEY in his
dissent in the Slaughter House Cases, where he upholds the opinion that
since the United States must be presumed to be impliedly forbidden to'
deny to a citizen of the United States the rights of a free-born Englishman, among which is the right to carry on any trade or occupation he
desires, the States, after the adoption of the amendment, could not grant
monopolies except to carry out the police laws. See Slaughter House
Cases, Dist. Op., I6 Wall, p. ii4-tI6; AMERICAN LAw RnEGISTR AND
RI.vizw, Vol. XXXI, 272-275 (April, 1892.).
The point of view here taken is, that a written constitution adopted
by a free people, though it confer upon the legislature ever so general
grants of legislative power, will never, without express words to that
effect, be deemed as granting to the legislature the right to disregard the
fundamental principles of individual liberty which are found imbedded
in the hearts and engraved in the laws of all English-speaking people.
The boundaries of these principles may be hard to define, but, it is contended, they do exist, and when plainly disregarded by legislative bodies,
it is the right and duty of the Court to set the law aside.
This point of view regarding constitutional law holds good with State
judges interpreting a State constitution.
The whole question involved in laws like the one whose constitu-
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the power to murder by Act of Assembly; to rob by statute;
to convert innocence into crime, and punish it as such by
the same law? The power ,of the legislature to do these
things was believed in when our Constitution irohibited
attainders and ex host facto laws, and compelled compensation for the taking of private property for public purposes.
That little rejard has been paid by the legislatures of our
States to the spirit of these restraints is evident. The
reason is not difficult to find or far to seek. But it is no
justification for a court to interfere with the discretion of a
'State legislature, because the persons possessing the discretion cannot be trusted, or because there exists no appeal
from the court's judgment.
The spectacle of a government that cannot prohibit a
contract merely because two grown persons desire to make
it, is so utterly absurd as to be quite-beyond the region of
discussion if government of any kind is to continue. The
wisdom. of the particular interference maybe debatable, but.
it is simply ridiculous to assert that a State has no right to
interfere with the individual's right to contract when courts
uphold the power of the State to forbid 'aharmless wager,
the contracting of .a debt for whisky, and a promise to pay
a larger price for a risky loan of money than for one *as
secure as the State itself. If we compare the assertion in
•Godtharles & Co. v. Wigeman with that since made
-by the same court in Com. v. Biddle,' to the effect
that the State can makE it criminal to make any contract
-unless the State is restrained by the State constitution,
*we have what .certainly cannot be called the harmony of
-thelaw on this Very important subject of daily life. Both
4f these are mere dicta.
tionality is here denied, whether we consider them as violating the Constitution oi(the United States, or of the State, in cases where no ei-press
prohibition appears in the State constitution, is this:-Where a free people
adopt a written constitution, are there any implied limits on general
grants of legislative authority; and if so, what are these implied restrictions, and do they prohibit the legislation whose constitutionality is
in question?-[BD.].
Ix39 Pa. St., iiS .
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It is quite astonishing to note how men who have dealt
with constitutional questions cannot see, or rather will not
act on the plain rule that a constitutional question is, and
must always be, so far as a court is concerned, a question of
lower, not of 'ght. Constitutions might limit the power
of the legislature by a standard of justice of which the
legislature is not to be the judge. Yet in all the wild
endeavors to fetter the government nothing so absurd 'as
this has ever been attempted. But how invariably have
the courts fallen into the snare of substituting the question
of right for the question of power, thus converting themselves into a legislature! It seems to have escaped their
observation that this course tends to remove from the legislature all sense of obligation. Constantly we find things
done by them with a reliance on the courts to correct the
iniquity if there be any.
Chief Justice GIBSON, of Pennsylvania, once announced
that there was fiothing to prevent the legislature taking
private property for private uses. He retracted, it is true.
In doing so, however, he failed to see that not one private
bill, by which selling or mortgaging another's property was
authorized, can possibly be sustained except upon the theory
that the legislature has power to take the property of one
man and give it to another. On the question oflower there
is no distinction between a compulsory sale and confiscation or between property of a man of forty and of a child
of twenty-one less one day.
The most striking instance, however, of the loss of an
anchorage in constitutional interpretation is to be seen in
Budd v. New York.' A dissent of three judges shows that
'the case was warmly discussed. And yet, while the sole
question was the power of a State to regulate prices charged
by a grain elevator, not one person, counsel or court, seem
to have started with 'the simple inquiry -where
is the
clause in the Constitution which prohibits such a thing?
On the contrary, time-honored sentences from Magna
Charta, supposed to be embodied in the Constitution of the
1 1143 U. S., 517 (1892).
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United States, was the nature of the argument relied on.
And all w9 can.infer from the judgment is that it is not inrproper to apply the principles of the Magna Charta to
* exclud the power of the State to name prices for commodities or services. Yet who could ever suppose it to have
-such a meaning? I
It may be very disagreeable to accept the proposition
,that the legislature of a State can alter prices ; to wake Up
to the consciousness that the legislature, if it sees fit, can
-.regulate what we shall eat and whit we shall drink, and
wherewithal we shall be clothed, and what kind of business we- "halengage in, but, it is plain this is the cisi.
•:.tless there -is a restriction imposed by something that is,
not ,in the Constitution. With regard to drinking, no onet
-has 'ever questioned the power of the legislature and it is
exercised everywhre; and if the Constitution does inhibit
such legislation, how can we except what is called. the
'polieepbwer from that inhibition? Is there anything more
grotesque than the modern rule which overrides by impli' The dissent of Mr. Justice BRZwAR is nevertheless, in strict accorj•
'with 011 his previous utterances on constitutional questions.. He says,
P. 551! "The -paternal theory of government is to me odioius. The
utmost possible liberty to the individual, and the fullest possible protectiop to him and his property is both the limitation andfhe duty of gov-.,
ern'ment. If it may regulate the price of one service, which is not a public service, or the compensation for the use of one kind of property which
is not devoted to pubic use, why may it not with etual reason regulatethe
price of all service, and the compensation to be paid for the *useof all
property?, And if so, 'Looking Backward, ' is nearer than a dream."
Compare with his opinion in State v. Nemaha Co., 7 Kas., pp. 554-5:
"The object of the constitution of a free government is to grant, -not to
withdraw, power. The habit of regarding the legislature as inherently
omnipoent, and looking at what express restrictions the Constitution has
placed upon its acti6n, is dangerous aid tends to error. Rither, regarding first, those essential truths, those axioms of civil and political liberty
upon which all free governments are founded; andx secondly, statements
.of.pxinciples in the Bill of Rights, upon which the governmental structure is reared, we may then properly inquire what powers the words of
the Constitution, he terms of the grant, convey." Compare also opinion
of Mr. Justice MILLER in Loan Asso. v. Topeka, 20 Wall., p. 663 (1874).
See also cases cited in articie entitled "Is the Bounty on Sugar constitutional?"

3r Amali. LAw

RUG. AND

Ruv., 3O (May, i892)-[ED. ] .
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,cation the express words of the Constitution by calling this
new functionary the PolicePower? Such was the war power
that was once supposed to suspend the Constitution.
There is no difficulty in the matter except that of
being willing to trust the powers that be. We should
remember that there is an unwritten Constitution here
quite as much as there is in England. That the courts cannot
enforce it on the legislature here any more than they can
there appears to be deemed unimportant. Yet it is not to be
enforced by the courts here, any more than by English
courts.
And we may with perfect confidence say it
is quite as sacredly observed and much more so than the
written one. No one has ever heard of an attempt to
take A's property from him and vest it in B uyzjuslly. And
yet private bills did take property every year in Pennsylvania
till the Price Act, of 1853, and never once worked anything
but justice, and quite as well as it has been dbne since
tho power has been committed to the courts. I know of
two instances under the direction of the courts which one
may confidently say could not have been got from the most
careless legislature that ever sat at Harrisburg. Nor were
they cases in which the attention of the Court was not
called to the facts.
But to revert to the case of Budd v. New York, which
seems to be fraught with evil incalculable and immeasurable. The majority sustain the statute regulating prices
under the police power, and because the public may or
even must employ the elevators, though the supposed restriction which is thus avoided is not in the written Constitution.
If this is true of the elevator business, may it
not be as truly said of any other business? And yet the
majority and minority assume the want of power to regulate
prices. Look at our act, making it criminal to agree that
a bushel shall be more or less than seventy-six pounds.
Look at the bread act, making it criminal to sell by the
loaf. But the wonderful thing is no one who sustained
the statute called attention to the want of a prohibition or
made the point that till this was set up there was nothing
to discuss. Not one person, counsel or judge seems to have
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been aware that the primar question is that stated in Marbury v.Madi.on. To what part of the Constitution is thVS
repugnant ?. Not of course that they did not all know the
tle, but that it was to be applied in practice "aswell as
announced: There is, indeed, a showof placing the decsion on the express words of the Constitution by citing the
first section of the XIVth Amendment. But in a country
where the hire of mioney is fixed by law it would be absurd to
suppose this was under the scope of that amendment. The
real argument, however, is based on, first, the obsoleteness of
the theory of paternal government, not on any restriction on
the legislation; second,-on the puequal operation of the law.
It may be assumed that if there had been a pretence of any
express prohibition it would not have escaped the attention,
of Mr. Justice BREWER, Mr. Justice FIELD and Mr. Justice
BROWN.

The. climax is arrived at when the inalienablergkt tfeiliberty and the pursuit of ha piness is dravelr contended
to be a ground for refusing to enforce a statute like this.
"'Very clearly inalienable by the- legislative power, not by
the individual, is here'meant. The Court was not dealing'
withW the question of a suiide or a nunnery. In a country
where we alienate life by the halter, and restrain liberty
by jails, and prohibit the use of ardent spirits and beer,
quite regardless of how fruitless is the pursuit of happiness to
many under such restrictions, one cannot but stop to ask
what men mean by thdse words or if they attach any real
meaning to their words. For it is as plain as day that
it is quite immaterial whether the legislature, or the
Court are vested with the prerogative bf determining in
what respect and when the owners of these inalienable
privileges may be deprived of them against their will.
The importance of all this lies here. At the present
time the reasons found in opinions of judges are accepted
as 'la*. The-decision of the Court is overlooked.1 And
therefore we shall be met hereafter with the necessary de'The Court itself is much to blame for this. In place of the point
decided we are generally referred to an utterance of a judge or of the
Court speaking by Mr. Justice So-and-so.
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